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Since the late 1990s, China’s growing engagement with neighbouring countries 
and international institutions has facilitated its ‘peaceful rise’ to Great Power 
status.1 Since the 2008 global financial crisis, however, the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) has begun to place greater importance on defending its core national 
interests and asserting its maritime sovereignty claims. Many scholars describe 
China’s new approach to foreign policy as ‘assertive’.2 China has begun to interfere 
with US surveillance activities, and in the territorial disputes in the South and 
East China Seas Beijing has displayed muscular behaviour not seen in many years, 
causing alarm among many of its neighbours.3 On the other hand, China has been 
increasingly proactive on such matters as anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of 
Aden, financial and monetary reform, and international cooperation regarding the 
Libyan civil war.4 Beijing has become more ambitious in articulating its foreign 
policy goals with the aim of being treated as Washington’s equal,5 while its 
* The author would like to thank Tse-Kan Leng, Philip Szue-chin Hsu, Hsiao-chi Hsu and Chia-yi Lee for their 
constructive comments on the earlier drafts.
1 Bijian Zheng, ‘China’s “peaceful rise” to Great-Power status’, Foreign Affairs 84: 5, Sept.–Oct. 2005, pp. 18–24; 
Lei Yu, ‘China’s strategic partnership with Latin America: a fulcrum in China’s rise’, International Affairs 91: 5, 
Sept. 2015, pp. 1047–68.
2 There are two perspectives on China’s new assertiveness in the literature. Many scholars refer to Beijing’s more 
muscular approach to foreign affairs. See e.g. Michael D. Swaine, ‘Perceptions of an assertive China’, China 
Leadership Monitor, no. 32, Spring 2010, pp. 1–19; Brantly Womack, ‘Beyond win–win: rethinking China’s 
international relationships in an era of economic uncertainty’, International Affairs 89: 4, July 2013, pp. 911–28. 
Others hold that China’s new assertiveness is due to the fact that it now has a greater stake in global issues. See 
Thomas J. Christensen, ‘The advantages of an assertive China: responding to Beijing’s abrasive diplomacy’, 
Foreign Affairs 90: 2, March–April 2011, pp. 54–67; Dingding Chen, Xiaoyu Pu and Alastair Iain Johnston, 
‘Debating China’s assertiveness’, International Security 38: 3, Winter 2014, pp. 176–83. To take a balanced view, 
I follow Kevin Narizny in defining ‘assertiveness’ as a level of activism in a state’s foreign policy that involves 
a state’s ‘willingness to pay the costs, whatever they may be, for a particular strategy’. See Kevin Narizny, 
The political economy of grand strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), p. 11. It should be noted that 
others disagree with the assertiveness argument and argue that there is more continuity than change in China’s 
foreign policy. See Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘How new and assertive is China’s new assertiveness?’, International 
Security 37: 4, Spring 2013, pp. 7–48; Björn Jerdén, ‘The assertive China narrative: why it is wrong and how 
so many still bought into it’, Chinese Journal of International Politics 7: 1, 2014, pp. 47–88.
3 Feng Zhang, ‘Rethinking China’s grand strategy: Beijing’s evolving national interests and strategic ideas in 
the reform era’, International Politics 49: 3, 2012, p. 334.
4 Christensen, ‘The advantages of an assertive China’.
5 For example, Beijing has proposed the idea of a ‘new model of Great Power relations’ (xinxin daguo guanxi) 
with Washington. See Cui Tiankai and Pang Hanzhao, ‘China–US relations in China’s overall diplomacy in 
the new era: on China and the US working together to build a new-type relationship between major coun-
tries’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 20 July 2012, http://www.fmprc.gov.
cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/bmdyzs_664814/xwlb_664816/t953682.shtml. (Unless otherwise noted 
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diplomatic establishment seems to view the country as a leading global power 
with broadened interests and responsibilities, and is abandoning the conservative 
and low-profile approach to foreign affairs that characterized the initial stage of 
the reform era.6
Given the significance of China’s rise over the past few decades, it is imperative 
to explain why Beijing has started pursuing a more assertive foreign policy. There 
are a number of possibilities when considering this question. Some observers 
focus on the characteristics of the Chinese leaders.7 Others place emphasis on the 
coordination problems within the decision-making process caused by the exist-
ence of multiple domestic agents.8 Yet others explain Beijing’s external behav-
iour with reference to the growth in China’s economic and military capabilities.9 
Each of these factors operates at a somewhat different level of analysis—from 
the individual, to domestic politics, to the overall system.10 All three types of 
factors—actors, domestic circumstances and systemic conditions—contribute to 
almost all the explanations. But in certain circumstances, one or other of these 
factors seems more salient.11 One particular set of factors can lead us to conclu-
sions about the causes of the change in China’s assertiveness that are different 
from conclusions generated by the others—and hence to different predictions of 
Beijing’s future behaviour.
This article examines each of the above-mentioned levels of explanation and 
concludes that China’s more assertive foreign policy since 2009 can mainly be 
attributed to elite perceptions and leadership preferences. The findings suggest 
that individual factors can play a major role in explaining China’s external behav-
iour, especially when the perceptions of the political elites are deeply embedded 
in the leader’s preferences. 
As China’s new leader Xi Jinping begins to exert his transformative influence 
on the country’s role in global politics, it is important to examine the reasons 
behind its more assertive foreign policy in order to identify potential regional and 
at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 3 May 2016.)
6 On China’s conservative approach to foreign policy in the reform era, see Robert S. Ross, ‘Beijing as a 
conservative power’, Foreign Affairs 76: 2, March–April 1997, pp. 33–44.
7 Oriana Skylar Mastro, ‘Why Chinese assertiveness is here to stay’, Washington Quarterly 37: 4, Winter 2015, pp. 
151–70; Irene Chan and Mingjiang Li, ‘New Chinese leadership, new policy in the South China Sea dispute?’; 
Journal of Chinese Political Science 20: 1, 2015, pp. 35–50.
8 Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, New foreign policy actors in China, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 26, Sept. 2010, http://
books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP26.pdf; Thomas J. Christensen, ‘More actors, less coordination? New chal-
lenges for the leaders of a rising China’, in Gilbert Rozman, ed., China’s foreign policy: who makes it, and how 
is it made? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Jingjan Zeng, Yuefan Xiao and Shaun Breslin, ‘Securing 
China’s core interests: the state of the debate in China’, International Affairs 91: 2, March 2015, pp. 245–66.
9 John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The gathering storm: China’s challenge to US power in Asia’, Chinese Journal of Inter-
national Politics 3: 4, 2010, pp. 381–96; Yuan-kang Wang, Harmony and war: Confucian culture and Chinese power 
politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).
10 The study of levels of analysis in international relations is a discipline in which scholars typically talk about the 
system, the state and the individual as the main units of analysis. For seminal works, see Kenneth N. Waltz, 
Man, the state, and war: a theoretical analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); David J. Singer, ‘The 
level-of-analysis problem in International Relations’, World Politics 14: 1, Oct. 1961, pp. 77–92.
11 Robert Jervis, Perception and misperception in international politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 
pp. 16–17; Barry Buzan, ‘The level of analysis problem in International Relations reconsidered’, in Ken Booth 
and Steve Smith, eds, International Relations theory today (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1995), pp. 212–13.
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global implications. This analysis can enhance our understanding of why tradi-
tional explanations of Chinese foreign policy behaviour may miss their predictive 
mark if they do not include the role of the state leader. Therefore, studying the 
reasons behind China’s assertive external behaviour not only helps to improve 
existing theoretical models in international relations and foreign policy analysis, 
but also informs our understanding of the broader policy implications of China’s 
rise.
Explaining China’s new assertiveness
In order to understand the external behaviour of the PRC, previous research 
has taken into account both international and domestic factors.12 The challenge 
for foreign policy analysis is to investigate further the conditions in which either 
domestic or international factors predominate. In seeking to explain China’s 
assertiveness, we should begin by considering the potential weight of broad, 
general causes, such as system-level factors, and then focus on those unit-level 
and individual-level elements that are distinctive to China but can potentially be 
applied to other countries.
System-level explanations
System-level explanations of China’s new assertiveness start from the premise that 
international pressures are essentially determinate. These pressures, such as distri-
butions of power, networks of alliances or patterns of global trade, can be defined 
in terms of systemic characteristics because they exert a powerful, generalizable 
influence on any country’s foreign policy. Thus, the more we can support the 
analysis of systemic variables of this kind, the more we can develop a theory that 
may have cross-national applications.
In a sense, Chinese assertiveness is a response to changes in the international 
distribution of power, particularly those consequent on the events of the 2008 
global financial crisis.13 Thanks, in part, to China’s role as the ‘global economic 
powerhouse’ and the slowdown that afflicted most western countries, China 
emerged as a leading global power with new interests and responsibilities. It was 
only natural for Beijing to increase its demands that other countries respect its 
national interests and international status. In these circumstances, at least three 
plausible system-level explanations for China’s assertiveness can be identified. 
They are state power, external threat and national interest.
China’s assertiveness as the outcome of a sudden increase in its power   Perhaps the most 
convenient explanation for Beijing’s more hard-line foreign policy is the dramatic 
shift that took place in the international distribution of power as the United States 
12 See e.g. Shaun Breslin, ‘Understanding China’s regional rise: interpretations, identities and implications’, 
International Affairs 85: 4, July 2009, pp. 817–35.
13 Xinbo Wu, ‘Understanding the geopolitical implications of the global financial crisis’, Washington Quarterly 33: 
4, Oct. 2010, pp. 155–63.
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floundered in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and China continued 
to grow. In particular, the rise in China’s economic strength and declining faith 
in America’s leadership capabilities have produced a new spirit of assertiveness 
against the United States in the political and security fields.14 The global financial 
crisis thus presented an opportunity for rational and calculating Chinese leaders to 
pursue their goals and preferences.15 When the PRC becomes more powerful, it 
tends to adopt a more costly and confrontational foreign policy, whereas it is less 
assertive when its power begins to wane. As Avery Goldstein has already noted:
If China’s relative capabilities were to increase dramatically, or if Beijing concluded that 
the system’s most capable actors lacked the interest or resolve to resist Chinese initiatives 
...  China might then shift to a strategy that more assertively attempted to reshape the 
international system according to its own preferences. Such a relaxation of the external 
constraints on China’s foreign policy could result from an improbably rapid process of 
economic and military modernization that quickly elevated the PRC to superpower status 
or if China’s strongest competitors proved unable or unwilling to remain internationally 
engaged.16
However, such an explanation simply cannot be squared with the facts of the 
situation since 2008. The PRC’s relative capability has definitely improved since 
the global financial crisis, but it is not quite first among equals.17 Beijing is playing 
a critical military role, but not one that overshadows the military contribution of 
the United States. As figure 1 shows, Chinese military spending has consistently 
risen since the turn of the century, yet at a rate still roughly on a par with that of 
the United States. As Robert Ross notes, ‘China has yet to develop significant new 
military capabilities that can explain China’s new diplomacy.’18 More importantly, 
there is no reason to expect a direct relationship between China’s economic ascent 
and the United States’ economic decline. By any objective assessment the United 
States remains the world’s most powerful economy in almost every category.19
China’s assertiveness as a response to a growing threat to the territory of the PRC    Even if 
Chinese power had not significantly increased, perhaps a sabre-rattling strategy 
was necessary because of the intensified maritime disputes that threatened Beijing’s 
longstanding commitment to the integrity of its national territory.20 For example, 
14 Mearsheimer, ‘The gathering storm’.
15 Kai He and Huiyun Feng, ‘Debating China’s assertiveness: taking China’s power and interests seriously’, 
International Politics 49: 5, 2012, pp. 633–44.
16 Avery Goldstein, Rising to the challenge: China’s grand strategy and international security (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2005), p. 199.
17 Mark Beeson and Fujian Li, ‘What consensus? Geopolitics and policy paradigms in China and the United 
States’, International Affairs 91: 1, Jan. 2015, pp. 93–109.
18 Robert S. Ross, ‘The domestic sources of China’s “assertive diplomacy”, 2009–10: nationalism and Chinese 
foreign policy’, in Rosemary Foot, ed., China across the divide: the domestic and global in politics and society (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 74.
19 Joseph S. Nye, ‘American and Chinese power after the financial crisis’, Washington Quarterly 33: 4, Oct. 2010, 
pp. 143–53; Michael Beckley, ‘China’s century? Why America’s edge will endure’, International Security 36: 3, 
Winter 2011, pp. 41–78; Alexander L. Vuving, ‘The future of China’s rise: how China’s economic growth will 
shift the Sino-US balance of power, 2010–2040’, Asian Politics and Policy 4: 3, July 2012, pp. 401–23.
20 M. Taylor Fravel, ‘China’s strategy in the South China Sea’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 33: 3, Dec. 2011, 
pp. 292–319. See also Katherine Morton’s article in this issue, ‘China’s ambition in the South China Sea: is a 
legitimate maritime order possible?’, International Affairs 92: 4, July 2016, pp. 909–940 below.
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China began to interfere significantly with US surveillance activities in the South 
China Sea, to oppose US–South Korean joint exercises in the Yellow Sea, and to 
lodge protests with Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines over sovereignty disputes 
in the East and South China Seas. According to this argument, China’s tougher 
position in the contested maritime areas was aimed at deterring other countries 
from challenging the status quo. As Alastair Iain Johnston notes, ‘in response to 
more proactive diplomacy by other claimants to establish the legal boundaries of 
their claims in the region’ Beijing began to ‘assert the extent of China’s claims so 
as to clarify what it can (and will) diplomatically and militarily defend’.21 This 
pattern of assertiveness seems to be reactive rather than proactive, defensive rather 
than offensive.
However, it is difficult to support the argument that China’s actions were 
merely reactive and defensive, as on some occasions it was Beijing rather than 
any of the other parties that was responsible for escalating the tension, particu-
larly regarding the maritime disputes.22 For example, after the collision between 
a Chinese fishing vessel and the Japanese coastguard in waters off the Diaoyutai/
Senkaku Islands in 2010, Beijing ceased high-level contacts with Tokyo, suspended 
Chinese exports of rare earth metals to Japan and connived in large anti-Japanese 
protests. Similarly, in its dispute with the Philippines over  Scarborough Shoal, 
Beijing not only conducted military exercises in the area but also restricted the 
import of agricultural products from the Philippines and stopped Chinese tourist 
groups from going there.23 While no serious threat was posed to China’s security 
21 Johnston, ‘How new and assertive is China’s new assertiveness?’, p. 19.
22 Derek Pham, ‘Gone rogue? China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea’, Journal of Politics and Society 22: 1, 
2011, pp. 139–64; Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘The sources of Chinese conduct: explaining Beijing’s assertiveness’, 
Washington Quarterly 37: 4, Winter 2015, pp. 133–50.
23 Samantha Hoffman, ‘Sino-Philippine tension and trade both rising amid Scarborough standoff ’, China Brief 
Figure 1: Military spending of China and the United States, 1999–2014 
(US$ millions)
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interests in the contested areas, Beijing seemed to be deliberately asserting its 
sovereignty claims through the use of aggressive tactics.24
China’s assertiveness as a response to increasing overseas economic interests which demanded 
more diplomatic activism    The third systemic explanation attributes China’s outward 
assertiveness to its integration into the world economy and the expansion of its 
economic interests. In response to China’s increasing foreign trade, Beijing began 
to extend the country’s diplomatic and military reach. In particular, the People’s 
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) embarked on the construction of a blue-water 
navy to safeguard the country’s sea lines of communication (SLOCs). With the 
development of capabilities for distant naval operations, including the construction 
of aircraft carriers, China aims to develop ‘limited power projection’ to protect its 
regional and overseas interests.25 Unfortunately, PLAN’s modernization drive has 
triggered an arms race in the region, creating a widespread perception since 2009 
that China is practising gunboat diplomacy.26
This explanation fails on two grounds. First, there was no surge in export and 
import activity in China after the 2008 financial crisis. As figure 2 shows, China’s 
international trade rose to 65 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2006, 
but by 2014 had fallen back to around 40 per cent of GDP. Overall, China’s contin-
uing prosperity was driven by enlarging domestic consumption, not by expanding 
foreign trade. Second, China’s economic interests are likely to be threatened by 
efforts to flex its maritime muscle. China’s trade with the United States and Japan, 
its largest and third-largest trading partners respectively, could only be jeopardized 
by the kind of maritime machismo that Washington and Tokyo would naturally 
find alarming. China’s energy imports from the Middle East are also protected by 
American free trade and freedom of navigation policy. China’s image of inter-
national assertiveness will do little to serve its business community’s interest in 
expanding foreign markets.
In sum, a system-level examination of China’s changing external environment 
and overseas economic interests fails to provide a plausible explanation of Beijing’s 
foreign policy shift since 2009. Given that China is likely to overtake the United 
States and become the world’s largest economy by 2020, it has no need to change 
current favourable international trends. It seems that China’s traditional foreign 
policy course, governed by the maxim ‘hide one’s capabilities and bide one’s time’ 
(taoguang yanghui), would continue to ensure a peaceful external environment for 
the country’s economic development. As Yuen Foong Khong bluntly puts it:
12: 9, 26 April 2012, pp. 13–16.
24 Beijing’s deliberate extension of its ‘core interests’ argument further calls into question its true intentions. See 
Kai He and Huiyun Feng, ‘China’s bargaining strategies for a peaceful rise: successes and challenges’, Asian 
Security 10: 2, 2014, pp. 168–87; Zeng et al., ‘Securing China’s core interests’.
25 Michael A. Glosny, Phillip C. Saunders and Robert S. Ross, ‘Debating China’s naval nationalism’, International 
Security 35: 2, Fall 2010, pp. 161–75; Andrew B. Kennedy, ‘China’s new energy-security debate’, Survival 52: 
3, June–July 2010, pp. 137–58; Baohui Zhang, ‘Chinese foreign policy in transition: trends and implications’, 
Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 39: 2, 2010, pp. 39–68.
26 Yves-Heng Lim, ‘How (dis)satisfied is China? A power transition theory perspective’, Journal of Contemporary 
China 24: 92, 2015, pp. 280–97.
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China’s best shot at dislodging the United States is to continue growing at 6 to 8 percent 
annually for another quarter century. When China’s leaders say that they must continue 
to focus on internal economic development, and that in turn requires a peaceful and stable 
Asia, I read that to mean that they are in no hurry to displace the United States ...  Another 
twenty-five years of strong economic growth and China might be in a position to play the 
role that the United States played after World War II, in Asia and beyond.27
Unit-level explanations
A second approach to explaining Chinese assertiveness is to emphasize the role of 
domestic pressure in shaping external behaviour. Although international pressure 
may constrain state leaders’ policy choices, in the final analysis their decisions 
are critically shaped by domestic politics, fuelled by competing preferences and 
interests.28 Domestic factors, such as power succession, state structure and societal 
interests, can provide clues to the respective likelihood of change or continuity 
within a given policy. Therefore, domestic politics influences China’s external 
behaviour by creating internal incentives for diplomatic activism.
The following paragraphs attempt to show how these domestic factors both 
drive and direct the process of China’s assertive foreign policy. Three types of 
explanation can be advanced, differing from one another in respect of which 
domestic factors are privileged in the analysis and how much weight is assigned 
27 Yuen Foong Khong, ‘Primacy or world order? The United States and China’s rise—a review essay’, Interna-
tional Security 38: 3, Winter 2013, p. 172.
28 See e.g. Graham T. Allison, Essence of decision: explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); 
Robert D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games’, International Organization 









Figure 2: China’s foreign trade as % of GDP, 1999–2014
Source: Author’s estimate based on annual data from National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
China Statistical Yearbook, http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/Statisticaldata/AnnualData/.
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to external behaviour. These types of explanation are bureaucratic competition, 
elite struggle and the upsurge of nationalism.
China’s assertiveness as a consequence of bureaucratic competition    Perhaps the most 
popular explanation for China’s hard-line policy is that it is the outcome of 
competition among governmental actors. Given the increasing diversity and 
plurality of China’s decision-making process, many scholars have suggested that 
attention should focus on the influence of interest groups on Chinese foreign 
policy.29 For example, the PLA has a greater capacity to shape foreign policy 
agendas.30 Bureaucrats, such as local government officials and managers of state-
owned enterprises, may emphasize certain national interests that complement 
their more parochial objectives. Scholarship in this tradition argues that China’s 
tough behaviour might be driven by the desire of certain ministries or agencies to 
increase their budgets, to promote sectoral trade or to ensure adequate supplies of 
energy.31 From this perspective, China’s provocative behaviour could reflect a shift 
either in the relative power of relevant actors or in the structure of the decision-
making process, which in turn is seen as the result of the Chinese government’s 
dysfunctional internal dynamics.
Nevertheless, the explanatory power of bureaucratic competition is, at best, 
uncertain for at least three reasons. First, such an explanation is insufficient to 
account for the dramatic shift in China’s foreign policy within such a short time-
span. Policy inertia is a more likely outcome in countries with many competing 
bureaucracies that participate in decision-making, as interest groups that favour 
the status quo have opportunities to thwart policy change.32 The more fragmented 
a state’s decision-making, the higher the likelihood that powerful actors will 
impede policy change. Second, competition among bureaucrats also means that 
powerful actors cannot make foreign policy decisions alone. The fragmented 
decision-making process could actually give party leaders a certain amount of 
leeway in controlling policy agendas and making decisions.33
Finally, as some scholars have observed, party leaders remain in firm control of 
foreign affairs.34 We often see a restructuring of the decision-making process when 
there is a shift in relative power at the top of the bureaucracy. However, neither 
the PLA nor state-owned enterprises have increased their presence in the Polit-
29 See e.g. Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, ‘China’s new diplomacy’, Foreign Affairs 82: 6, Nov. 2003, pp. 
22–35; Bonnie S. Glaser and Evan S. Medeiros, ‘The changing ecology of foreign policy-making in China: 
the ascension and demise of the theory of “peaceful rise”’, China Quarterly, no. 190, June 2007, pp. 291–310; 
David Shambaugh, ‘Coping with a conflicted China’, Washington Quarterly 34: 1, Winter 2010, pp. 7–27.
30 See Phillip Saunders and Andrew Scobell, eds, The PLA’s role in national security policy-making (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2015).
31 Jakobson and Knox, New foreign policy actors in China; Wei Da, ‘Has China become “tough”?’, China Security 
6: 3, 2010, pp. 97–104; William H. Overholt, ‘Reassessing China: awaiting Xi Jinping’, Washington Quarterly 
35: 2, Spring 2012, pp. 121–37; Hongyi Lai and Su-Jeong Kang, ‘Domestic bureaucratic politics and Chinese 
foreign policy’, Journal of Contemporary China 23: 86, 2014, pp. 294–313.
32 David A. Welch, Painful choices: a theory of foreign policy change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
33 Mark W. Frazier, ‘China’s domestic policy fragmentation and grand strategy in global politics’, in Allen Carl-
son and Xiao Ren, eds, New frontiers in China’s foreign relations (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2011).
34 Michael D. Swaine, ‘China’s assertive behavior, part four: the role of the military in foreign crises’, China 
Leadership Monitor, no. 37, Jan. 2012, pp. 1–14; Ji You, ‘The PLA and diplomacy: unraveling myths about the 
military role in foreign policy making’, Journal of Contemporary China 23: 86, 2014, pp. 236–54.
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buro.35 Even after the establishment of the National Security Committee (NSC) 
in November 2013, the purpose of which is to enhance party leaders’ ability to 
limit and synchronize the actions of relevant agencies, manifestations of Chinese 
assertiveness persisted.36 For example, only a few days after the establishment of 
the NSC, Beijing announced a new Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) that 
encompassed the disputed Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.37 This 
initiative involved a clear, defined division of labour between the State Council, 
the Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
China’s assertiveness as a result of struggle within the country’s elites    Another poten-
tial explanation of Chinese assertiveness is that it is the result of elite competi-
tion during a period of leadership transition. That is to say, when China goes 
through a power succession crisis, the political elites are more likely to resort 
to jingoism to bolster their legitimacy, contributing to increased belligerence in 
China’s external behaviour.38 This is what happened in the run-up to the 18th 
Party Congress in November 2012, which would produce the next generation of 
Chinese leaders. The process was further complicated by an intensified conflict 
between elites—what became known as the ‘Bo Xilai affair’.39 One illustration 
of this was the assertion by a few officials that the South China Sea should be 
numbered among China’s ‘core interests’ alongside Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. 
While this was not national policy, the top leaders refrained from contradicting 
this assertion to avoid criticism from their political opponents.40 If this interpre-
tation were correct, moderation, as well as foreign policy discipline, would have 
been restored after the transition.
However, China’s continued assertiveness over time, even after Xi Jinping had 
been elected to the country’s highest posts early in 2013, has refuted the contention 
that this behaviour is the by-product of elite competition. Had fear of political 
survival among Chinese leaders been the motivation for the diplomatic about-
turn, we would expect the new foreign policy to have been re-examined or 
abandoned. Yet this is not the case. Moreover, China’s more proactive posture on 
global issues as wide-ranging as the reform of international financial institutions, 
operations to thwart piracy in the Gulf of Aden and international cooperation 
with respect to the Libyan civil war seems to indicate that its new foreign policy 
might be designed to appeal to more widespread sentiments.41 Perhaps it is rooted 
35 M. Taylor Fravel, ‘International Relations theory and China’s rise: assessing China’s potential for territorial 
expansion’, International Studies Review 12: 4, 2010, p. 522.
36 Friedberg, ‘The sources of Chinese conduct’, p. 142.
37 David Cohen, ‘East China Sea air defense moves: what for and why now?’, China Brief 13: 24, 27 Nov. 2013, 
pp. 1–3.
38 Avery Goldstein, ‘China’s foreign policy and the leadership transition: prospects for change under the “fifth 
generation”’, in Rozman, ed., China’s foreign policy, pp. 39–64; Suisheng Zhao, ‘Foreign policy implications of 
Chinese nationalism revisited: the strident turn’, Journal of Contemporary China 22: 82, 2013, pp. 535–53.
39 Prior to the 18th Party Congress, Bo Xilai, a member of the Politburo and the party secretary of Chongqing, 
was removed from all his posts and sentenced to a long prison term in a case involving murder and corruption. 
See Richard W. Hu and Steve Chan, ‘China’s new generation of leaders and regional challenges in East Asia’, 
Eurasian Geography and Economics 53: 6, 2012, p. 674.
40 Overholt, ‘Reassessing China’, p. 130.
41 Nele Noesselt, ‘China’s foreign strategy after the 18th Party Congress: business as usual?’, Journal of Chinese 
Political Science 20: 1, 2015, p. 29.
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not in parochially based political interests, but in a changing social climate that was 
undermining previous perceptions of China’s international status.
China’s assertiveness as a response to an upsurge of nationalism at home   The third unit-
level explanation for China’s hawkish behaviour is that it is a response to the 
resurgence of popular nationalism during the global financial crisis.42 China’s 
rebounding economy, along with the success of the 2008 Olympic Games and the 
military parade staged in 2009 to mark the 60th anniversary of the PRC, encour-
aged many Chinese to believe that ‘the western financial crisis was the culmination 
of thirty years of economic growth and of China’s rise to Great Power status’.43 
Meanwhile, although the Chinese leadership remains cautious where nationalism 
is concerned, leaders have become ‘more willing to follow the popular nationalist 
calls for confrontation against the Western powers and [China’s] neighbours’ in 
order to defend national interests.44 This suggests that it was nationalist pressure 
that nudged the Chinese government into a succession of maritime disputes 
and declaration of the ADIZ. In other words, the Chinese leadership has had to 
respond to nationalist sentiment to secure its legitimacy, rather than mobilizing 
mass nationalism to achieve foreign policy expansionism.
This ‘mob’ nationalism explanation fails on three grounds. First, concerns 
about the surge in popular nationalism might be exaggerated. Even after the 2008 
financial crisis, many Chinese were quite realistic in their perceptions of China’s 
international status.45 According to a Pew Global Attitudes survey, although over 
50 per cent of Chinese people believe that the PRC will eventually replace the 
United States as the world’s leading power, they still think the US, not China, is 
the world’s top economy (see figure 3).
Second, the rise of popular nationalism has not necessarily caused Beijing to 
lose control over its foreign policy. Chinese nationalism has reared its head repeat-
edly over the past few decades, with regular appeals to adopt aggressive policies. 
This argument fails to explain why the case is different this time.46 Finally, the 
Chinese leadership actually makes use of nationalism in its risky security strat-
egies.47 Given the state’s manipulation of the mass media and mass education, the 
Chinese leadership can generate public support for anything to serve its diplo-
matic purposes. Once nationalist fervour has been whipped up, leaders can claim 
that their choices were constrained and compromise is difficult.48
42 Christopher R. Hughes, ‘Reclassifying Chinese nationalism: the geopolitik turn’, Journal of Contemporary 
China 20: 71, 2011, pp. 601–20; Ning Liao, ‘Presentist or cultural memory: Chinese nationalism as constraint 
on Beijing’s foreign policy making’, Asian Politics and Policy 5: 4, 2013, pp. 543–65; Jian Zhang, ‘The domestic 
sources of China’s more assertive foreign policy’, International Politics 51: 3, 2014, pp. 390–97.
43 Ross, ‘The domestic sources of China’s “assertive diplomacy”’, p. 79.
44 Zhao, ‘Foreign policy implications of Chinese nationalism revisited’, p. 536.
45 As figure 3 shows, the number of Chinese people who believe the United States is the world’s top economy is 
consistently higher than the number who believe China is the world’s economic leader. The only exception 
was in the year 2009, when equal proportions of respondents (41%) opted for China and the United States.
46 Glosny et al., ‘Debating China’s naval nationalism’, p. 166; James Reilly, ‘A wave to worry about? Public 
opinion, foreign policy and China’s anti-Japan protests’, Journal of Contemporary China 23: 86, 2014, p. 205; 
Friedberg, ‘The sources of Chinese conduct’, p. 141.
47 Zeng et al., ‘Securing China’s core interests’, p. 251.
48 See e.g. Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C. Saunders, ‘Legitimacy and the limits of nationalism: China and 
the Diaoyu Islands’, International Security 23: 3, Winter 1998, pp. 114–46; Jessica Chen Weiss, Powerful patriots: 
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In short, there are two reasons why a unit-level examination of China’s 
bureaucratic competition, leadership transition and domestic nationalism fails 
to provide a credible explanation for China’s new foreign policy assertiveness. 
First, if domestic pressure were driving the Chinese regime to resort to an asser-
tive foreign policy, we would see the same level of assertiveness throughout the 
history of the PRC. This is not the case, however. China adopted a conservative 
and low-profile approach to foreign affairs under Jiang Zemin and his successor 
Hu Jintao. Second, the argument’s basic logic is flawed: if China really faced 
internal insecurity or regime vulnerability, it would choose a more cooperative 
strategy to maintain a stable external environment. If M. Taylor Fravel is correct, 
instability in China would lead it to seek better relations with neighbouring 
countries.49 Therefore, as will be discussed below, it may be China’s success, or 
‘perceived success’, in weathering the global financial crisis of 2008, that is behind 
its assertive foreign policy.
Individual-level explanations
The third and final approach—the individual-level explanation—assumes that 
policy change occurs because of changes in political elites’ perceptions.50 These 
elite perceptions are a set of interlocking ideas, beliefs and assumptions held either 
by a group of policy-makers or by individual leaders. International pressure is 
nationalist protest in China’s foreign relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
49 Fravel, Strong borders, secure nation: cooperation and conflict in China’s territorial disputes (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2008).
50 See e.g. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds, Ideas and foreign policy: beliefs, institutions, and politi-
cal change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Taking preferences seriously: a 
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Figure 3: Chinese perceptions of China or the United States as the world’s 
leading economic power, 2008–14
Source: Pew Research Center, Global indicators database, http://www.pewglobal.org/
database/indicator/17/survey/all/.
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interpreted subjectively through these preconceived beliefs and assumptions. In 
this respect, while China’s place in the world and its international interests may 
have remained unchanged, political elites’ understanding of them has changed 
substantially. The elites want to embrace a foreign policy that is commensurate 
with China’s new role in the international arena and the prestige it implies. As 
a result, a small circle of political leaders, policy-makers and intellectuals have 
collectively become a dynamic force behind China’s self-assertion.
The following explanations explore China’s attitudes since the financial crisis 
and their impact on foreign policy. They argue that elite perceptions of China’s 
global role and of Chinese priorities, or individual leaders’ preferences regarding 
this role and these priorities, shape the highly political choices involved in foreign 
policy shifts.
China’s assertiveness as a reflection of changes in dominant elite perceptions    The cognitive 
explanation for China’s assertiveness is that it is the manifestation of a ‘trium-
phalist’ mentality among Chinese elites and intellectuals. As figure 4 shows, the 
financial crisis has contributed to an upsurge in Chinese academic writing about 
the ‘US decline’ and the rise of the Chinese model of development. This has led 
Chinese elites to challenge the orthodoxy and support more ambitious policies.51 
State media and policy analysts began to champion the ‘Beijing consensus’ or the 
‘China model’ as an alternative to the western liberal order.52 Some policy-makers 
have proposed a ‘Chinese version of G2 (the Group of Two)’ to manoeuvre the 
country onto an equal footing with the United States.53 Others are convinced that 
Washington’s commitment to East Asia has declined and that China will sooner 
or later replace the United States as the world’s number one military power.54 As 
a consequence, Chinese leaders may think that there is a window of opportunity 
they can exploit, or that by engaging in conflicts the country could accumulate 
more resources.55 While the rise of an elite vision of national rejuvenation has 
nothing to say directly about whether China needs to acquire aircraft carriers or 
spacecraft, it implies the necessity of military modernization and an outward-
going strategy.
There are several caveats that should be applied to such an explanation. First, 
explanations for changes in behaviour based on assumptions about perceptions 
51 See e.g. Mingfu Liu, Zhongguo meng: hou Meiguo shidai de daguo siwei yu zhanlue dingwei [The China Dream: 
Great Power thinking and strategic posture in the post-American era] (Beijing: Zhongguo youyi chuban 
gongsi, 2010). For related disscusions, see William A. Callahan, ‘China’s strategic futures’, Asian Survey 52: 4, 
2012, pp. 617–42; Daniel C. Lynch, China’s futures: PRC elites debate economics, politics, and foreign policy (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2015).
52 Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Addressing US–China strategic distrust (Washington DC: Brookings Institu-
tion Press, 2012), pp. 8–11; Shaun Breslin, ‘The “China model” and the global crisis: from Friedrich List to a 
Chinese mode of governance?’, International Affairs 87: 6, Nov. 2011, pp. 1323–43.
53 Yinhong Shi, ‘The United States, East Asia, and Chinese “triumphalism”’, in Yong Wook Lee and Key-young Son, 
eds, China’s rise and regional integration in East Asia: hegemony or community? (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 47.
54 Bonnie Glaser and Lyle Morris, ‘Chinese perceptions of US decline and power’, China Brief 9: 14, 9 July 2009, 
pp. 4–6; Andrew Scobell and Scott W. Harold, ‘An “assertive” China? Insights from interviews’, Asian Security 
9: 2, 2013, pp. 111–31.
55 According to Liu Mingfu, a retired colonel of the PLA, the goal of the China Dream is to ‘grasp the strategic 
opportunity for strengthening the military’ in order to surpass America to become the world’s number one 
military power. See Liu, Zhongguo meng, p. 263.
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can be difficult, if not impossible, to prove wrong. Beijing’s provocative behav-
iour may indeed represent a manifestation of rampant triumphalism on the part 
of Chinese elites, but it may also reflect a carefully calibrated plan to achieve 
the regime’s diplomatic objectives.56 Undue faith in Beijing’s cognitive bias could 
lead to the danger of misperception. Moreover, even if triumphalism encour-
ages a rethinking of foreign policy, it does not necessarily imply a change of 
course. New thinking does not exert an influence on its own. In order to replace 
traditional thinking and acquire political endorsement within a government, new 
policy thinking has to serve the agenda of the ruling party.
Finally, the leadership plays a central role in the determination of a state’s 
foreign policy agenda. Especially in non-democratic countries, leaders who serve 
as the final arbiters in the selection of options are more able to mobilize societies 
to support a range of otherwise controversial and costly foreign and domestic 
policy objectives.57 As Oriana Skylar Mastro notes, ‘even if some Chinese thinkers 
disagreed with this interpretation of assertiveness leading to great foreign policy 
achievements, Chinese leaders may bury this dissent and double down on their 
preferred methods of promoting foreign policy interests regardless.’58 As a 
result, foreign policy change is more likely in non-democratic countries, since 
authoritarian leaders have the ability to switch quickly to a policy they believe is 
promising.
56 Friedberg, ‘The sources of Chinese conduct’, pp. 143–6.
57 Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, ‘Let us now praise great men: bringing the statesman back in’, 
International Security 25: 4, Spring 2001, pp. 107–46.








Figure 4: References to ‘US decline’ in Chinese academic journals, 1999–2014
Source: Author’s estimate based on data from China National Knowledge Index database, 
China academic journal network publishing database, http://epub.cnki.net/kns/brief/result.
aspx?dbPrefix=CJFQ.
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China’s assertiveness as a reflection of changes in the preferences of the dominant leader 
Whereas the cognitive explanation focuses on how political elites collectively 
shape foreign policy choices, the state leader explanation concentrates on the 
importance of the single actor in charge and the difference he or she makes to 
decisions. Taking the individual as a decision-making unit, if a leader has almost 
autocratic power, institutional constraint and bureaucratic consensus are fairly 
irrelevant. In such contexts, where leaders have the final say, what they believe 
about their foreign counterparts has a great impact on subsequent outcomes.59 
Given that authoritarian regimes have a preference for stability, it has been 
suggested that innovation in foreign policy is most likely to occur when there is 
a change of leadership. China’s assertive foreign policy is thus a result of the new 
leader’s assessments of the external environments and personal preferred options.
Although a thread of continuity has run through Chinese diplomacy, Xi 
Jinping’s rise to power in 2012 has seen a resurgence of well-known traditional 
Chinese views on international affairs.60 Since taking power, the new Chinese 
leader has talked of ‘striving for achievements’ (fenfa youwei), signalling a new 
theme in Chinese diplomacy.61 Nevertheless, he is perhaps best known for his 
‘China Dream’—a diplomatic initiative designed to bring about a great rejuvena-
tion of the Chinese nation.62 Xi’s new rhetoric may represent more than a tempo-
rary shift, suggesting that the guideline of keeping a low international profile 
(expressed in Deng Xiaoping’s mantra ‘hide one’s capabilities and bide one’s time’ 
[taoguang yanghui]), which has shaped Chinese foreign policy since the early 1990s, 
is finally giving way to a more activist inclination.63
Indeed, according to many observers of China, the new leader ‘has his own 
opinion on foreign affairs. He may act on his own convictions, instead of simply 
following those of his staff and advisers. He tends to be more assertive on foreign 
affairs.’64 David Lampton notes that ‘some “supreme” leaders, at the start of their 
terms, use external conflicts to shore up their positions with both the military and 
the populace, exerting more control over the PLA and external relations once they 
have consolidated power’.65 Indeed, as Oriana Skylar Mastro observes, ‘Xi Jinping 
59 Margaret G. Hermann, Thomas Preston, Baghat Korany and Timothy M. Shaw, ‘Who leads matters: the 
effects of powerful individuals’, International Studies Review 3: 2, 2001, pp. 83–131.
60 Xi has advocated a ‘Great Power diplomacy’ (daguo waijiao) with Chinese characteristics, including the promo-
tion of traditional culture and values. See ‘The central conference on work relating to foreign affairs was held 
in Beijing’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 29 Nov. 2014, http://www.fmprc.
gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1215680.shtml.
61 In his first work forum on peripheral diplomacy in October 2013, Xi emphasized that the country should 
‘strive for achievements’. See ‘Xi Jinping zai zhoubian waijiao gongzuo zuotanhui shang fabiao zhongyao 
jianghua’ [Xi Jinping delivers important speech at the periphery diplomacy work forum], Xinhua, 25 Oct. 
2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-10/25/c_117878897.htm.
62 As Xi has noted, ‘to realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is the greatest dream for the Chinese 
nation in modern history’. See ‘Xi pledges “great renewal of Chinese nation”’, Xinhua, 29 Nov. 2012, http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-11/29/c_132008231.htm.
63 Shaun Breslin, ‘China and the global order: signalling threat or friendship?’, International Affairs 89: 3, May 
2013, pp. 615–34; Rosemary Foot, ‘“Doing some things” in the Xi Jinping era: the United Nations as China’s 
venue of choice’, International Affairs 90: 5, Sept. 2014, pp. 1085–1100.
64 Lai and Kang, ‘Domestic bureaucratic politics and Chinese foreign policy’, p. 310.
65 David M. Lampton, Following the leader: ruling China, from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2014), p. 185.
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himself has articulated more hard-line policies concerning territorial disputes, 
and Chinese assertiveness has noticeably increased under his watch.’66 It seems 
fairly clear that the new Chinese leadership has recognized the need to go beyond 
‘biding its time’ in foreign policy and has opened the way for a shift towards a 
more proactive global stance.
However, such a leader-centric explanation should not be accepted without 
question. First, although Xi entered the top group of China’s decision-makers as 
early as 2007, there is scant evidence for attributing China’s assertiveness to this 
rising leader’s efforts.67 Policy-making in China, often characterized as a black box, 
is not sufficiently transparent to allow thoroughgoing research into the influence 
on the process of a certain individual. Moreover, it would be presumptuous to 
suggest that a change in the behaviour of a state is always down to the preferences 
of a particular leader at a specific time. The incentives for and constraints on any 
particular leader are formed by the environment, be it domestic or international. At 
the very least, therefore, both the individual and the systemic explanations should 
be considered as alternative independent variables in any multilevel analysis.
In sum, individual-level explanations indicate that China’s assertiveness is a 
function of both enduring elements in the Chinese political leadership and new 
policy-relevant perceptions. That these two ingredients are closely linked should 
not be surprising, since new perceptions win adherents only if they can be made 
to fit within a dominant leader’s preferences in a given historical setting. Faced 
with different external and internal environments, a leader will tend to invest in 
a foreign policy that will boost his or her international reputation as an effective 
statesperson, as well as consolidate the domestic coalitions that enable that leader 
to hold on to political power. Recognizing this fact, the Xi Jinping administra-
tion has begun to frame Chinese leadership in the region as an embodiment of 
enduring Chinese values and culture.
Conclusion
This article has examined the system-level, unit-level and individual-level expla-
nations for China’s more assertive foreign policy. It seems that systemic pressures 
would, if anything, militate against a change in Beijing’s traditional approach 
to foreign affairs. Although recent international trends favour the PRC, and 
Washington had gone out of its way to accommodate Beijing through the Obama 
administration’s policy of reassurance,68 China still fundamentally lacks the 
66 Mastro, ‘Why Chinese assertiveness is here to stay’, p. 153.
67 Xi Jinping was elected to the Politburo Standing Committee in 2007 and subsequently became China’s Vice-
President and then Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Committee. For a related discussion, see Jean-Marc 
F. Blanchard, ‘The People’s Republic of China leadership transition and its external relations: still searching 
for definitive answers’, Journal of Chinese Political Science 20: 1, 2015, pp. 1–16.
68 Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China’s rise: an insider’s account of America’s Asia strategy (Washington DC: Brook-
ings Institution Press, 2012). According to Scobell and Harold, the initial wave of Chinese assertiveness in 
2008–9 was prompted by a perception in Beijing that the Obama administration was accommodating China’s 
‘core interests’ through a policy of reassurance. As a consequence, the US administration changed its strategy 
towards China and strengthened its military and diplomatic posture in the Asia–Pacific through a policy of 
‘returning to Asia’. This caused China to perceive the United States as a threat and behave even more asser-
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capacity to truly balance the United States. Meanwhile, the internal and societal 
stresses faced by the Chinese leadership have also made assertiveness a less, not 
a more, attractive policy. More importantly, China’s increased assertiveness did 
not coincide with changes in international and domestic circumstances. Indeed, 
to a significant degree, the Chinese leadership is flying in the face of internal and 
external political and economic shifts: the slowdown in China’s economic growth, 
the intensification of the regional arms race, and the United States’ increasing 
preoccupation with Asia are all adding to the security challenges Beijing has to 
face, thus calling into question the continuing utility of this new foreign policy 
course.
Perhaps China’s new assertiveness can be better explained, then, in terms of 
the perceptions of its political elites and the preferences of its leaders. As Thomas 
Christensen has argued, certain perceptions and beliefs may cause Chinese leaders 
to initiate confrontational strategies.69 While major events in the international 
system may require the modification of foreign policy, it is the policy-makers who 
respond to this need. To shore up legitimacy at home, a skilful leader can act as an 
agent of change even in the absence of any overwhelming systemic or domestic 
forces.70 He or she can exploit the window of opportunity to ratchet up military 
buildup, extend the nation’s interests and expand the country’s geopolitical reach. 
While system- and unit-level approaches represent influential theoretical frame-
works, paying attention to the role of state leaders’ preferences might help us 
better comprehend some puzzling cases.
Individual-level analysis not only offers a better explanation of the sources 
of China’s assertiveness, but also provides a different perspective on the study 
of China’s rise. Conventional wisdom often sees the trajectory of China’s ascent 
through the lens of either system-level or state-level analysis, ignoring the impact 
of the state leaders’ preferences on China’s growing assertiveness in international 
politics.71 In particular, whether a stronger China will pursue a more cooperative 
or more confrontational strategy may hinge on the state leaders’ choices as they 
respond to a wide variety of circumstances. As a rising power that still lags behind 
the United States, China may have good reason to avoid provoking the world’s 
only superpower into a conflict that could delay its own rise. However, a Chinese 
leader who gives way to revisionist impulses or makes unrealistic commitments 
may prefer a costlier and more controversial foreign policy. To understand better 
the implications of China’s rise, we must take into account the role of the state 
leaders, as well as the psychological and perceptual factors that affect their evalu-
ation of costs and benefits.
It should be noted that systemic, domestic and individual factors can—and 
do—interact synergistically. This preliminary study does not suggest that the 
tively. See Scobell and Harold, ‘An “assertive” China?’.
69 Thomas J. Christensen, ‘Posing problems without catching up: China’s rise and challenges for US security 
policy’, International Security 25: 4, Spring 2001, pp. 5–40.
70 Charles F. Hermann, ‘Changing course: when governments choose to redirect foreign policy’, International 
Studies Quarterly 34: 1, March 1990, pp. 3–21.
71 See e.g. Robert Ross and Feng Zhu, eds, China’s ascent: power, security, and the future of international politics (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).
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perceptions of the state leaders alone are always responsible for the behaviour of 
a state at a specific time. Given that the analysis of China’s assertive foreign policy 
presented here covers only a limited period of time, it is impossible to specify all 
the expected interactions of the system-, unit- and individual-level explanations. 
While this study suggests that the aggregate effect of these interactions ought 
to reinforce inertia in China’s foreign policy, more research is imperative. Such 
research might usefully explore some of the underlying reasons for the differ-
ences (and similarities) between the factors associated with Chinese foreign policy 
restructuring.
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